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ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE EXISTENCE: 
MAN AND CITIZEN IN ROUSSEAU 
N. DENT 
Universitat de Birmingham 
RESUMEN: 
En este artículo se examinan algunos aspectos del contraste que 
según Rousseau se da entre ser hombre -una unidad numérica, un todo 
absoluto (E. 1, 39; IV 249'), y ser un ciudadano -una unidad frac- 
cionaria, cuyo «valor es determinado por su relación con el todo» (E. 
1, 40; IV, 249). 
SUMMARY: 
The objective of this paper is to consider one or two aspects of the 
contrast Rousseau claims there to be between being a man -a numerical 
unity, an absolute whole (E. 1, 39; IV, 24g1), and being a citizen- a 
fractional unity, whose «value is determined by his relation to the whole» 
(E. 1, 40; IV, 249). 
1. Editions, abbreviations, are as follows: Emile (E) tr. Allan Bloom, Basic Books, 
New York, 1979. The Social Contract (S.C.) tr. G.D.H. Cole, revised J. H. Brumfitt and 
J. C. Hall, Dent, London, 1973. 
A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (D.I.) - same - 
A Discourse on Political Economy (D.P.E.) - same - 
The roman numbers, followed by arabic page numbers, refer to the volume and page 
of J.-J. Rousseau: Oeuvres Cmpletes, edd. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Gallimard, 
111, 1964; IV, 1969. 
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Rousseau is commonly read as maintaining that no-one can be both 
rnan and citizen. One must choose between these exclusive possibilities; 
whichever choice one makes, one incurs unavoidable losses; if someone 
fails to choose, he will remain: 
Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his 
inclinations and his duties, ... never... either rnan or citizen. He will be good 
neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: 
a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing. (ibid.) . 
1 shall maintain that this is a misreadind of one of Rousseau's central 
thoughts, a misreading which arises largely because of a misunders- 
tanding of the character and significance that Rousseau ascribes to , 
amour-propre. If this misunderstanding is corrected, it can be seen that 
Rousseau held that being a rnan and being a citizen could, and should, 
not only be compatible but be mutually implicated, in that «completion» 
as a rnan requires assumption of the place of citizen, and appropiate 
characterisation of the station of a citizen depends upon incorporating 
essential attributes of rnan in it. (For the idea of «completion», see for 
instance E.3,203; Iv, 481; and E.5,455; IV, 833.) Rousseau holds, 1 shall 
claim, that the «double object», of raising rnan both for himself and for 
others, could be accomplished, although only with great difficulty and 
in the face of many obstacles, both inherent and circumstantial (see E. 1, 
41; IV, 251). The form of human community outlined in S.C. is a 
depiction of the manner of human life and union in which this «double 
object» is realised. 
For reasons of space, the defence of my position will not be as full 
as it should be. But 1 hope to establish a presumptive casee2 
1 begin with a brief statement of what 1 have referred to as a «common 
reading» of Rousseau's ideas in this matter. 1 shall draw on Judith 
Shklar's account3 for this, not because 1 think her account particularly 
faulty, but rather because it is instructive to find even so sensitive and 
careful a critic as Shklar persisting in certain very general presumptions 
about Rousseau's meaning and intent, presumptions which shape the 
overall character of her treatment. 
2.1 have considered these issues at greater length in my Rousseau (Blakwell, 1988), 
Ch. 1, 2, and 4. 
3. Judith N. Shklar (S.): Men and Citizens, Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
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According to Shklar, Rousseau offers two models of Utopia. «One 
model was a Spartan city, the other a tranquil household, and the two 
were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other» (S. 3). In the 
former model, we are offered «an irnage of the perfectly socialized man, 
the citizen whose entire life is absorbed by his social role» (S. 13). In 
this case, the individual: 
... loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive social 
unit. Here ... the group absorbs al1 his resources, emotional as well as 
physical ... the moi humain is crushed by the moi commun. And this is the 
very essence of the psychological transformation of man into a citizen (S. 
15). 
In the latter model, that of «the quiet village», the happiness of men 
springs from «unspoiled family love» (S. 21). 
Shklar goes on: 
Although the Golden Age is one of villages, the only social life that 
matters is within each household. This ... shelters ... a primary family, 
parents and their children. Self-sufficient and self-contained, they need no 
one but each other ... only within the family is perfect uncompetitive 
affection possible. (S. 23). 
These are the two models with reference to which Rousseau stand 
in judgrnent «to reveal the failures of actuality and to condemn the 
unpardonable» (S. 30). But neither of them comprises a complete good 
and meeting of need for men - even were a decisive choice for one or 
the other made. The «man of the Golden Age is brutish and stupid»; the 
impact of civilisation cannot be shaken off «by mere physical escape» 
(S. 31). Shklar continues: 
The whish to play a public role, to develop one's civic capacities, to 
belong to a purposeful order, to take part in an organized drama, is a much 
part of a morally adult life ... (S. 31-2). 
But the completion of this wish lies in the exclusion of «al1 private 
affections and associations, not only the family ... al1 inclinations are bent 
before xenophobia, communal isolation and pride, and a virtue that is 
sustained by the pressure of public opinion rather than by benevolence 
or love» (S. 31). We cannot, finally, try to secure the best of both worlds. 
These models do not contain elements in common which could be 
withdrawn from their setting and synthesised into a life accomodating 
to humans. Civil society - even in its rectified form envisaged in S.C. 
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- is «only the cure for social disease. It is ... not permanent abode for 
men» (S. 212). 
Why is it that we appear to be confronted by this impossible choice: 
either the extinction of individual identity, the transformation of man into 
«denatured» citizen; or the retention of individual identity, but only with 
a defensive withdrawal from society into an idealised family life? 
Shklar's answer, which she gives as Rousseau's, is that it is because if 
persons retain their individual identity and enter a wider social milieu, 
this not being accompanied by a transformation of the self, then their 
amour-propre, with its concerns and destructive energies, is immediately 
and fatefully brought into play. But why does this matter? How does this 
impose the choice? «Amour-propre», Shklar says, «arises out of asso- 
ciation as such» (S. 185). It is «that anxious awareness of oneself as a 
social object» that begins to «dominate our psychic economy» once we 
begin to associate with others on any other footing that of membership 
of an idealised family (S. E; see 10, 23, on the family). Once this 
«anxiety» begins to work, it breeds competition for personal precedence, 
for invidious distinction. Inequality, just in having the better of others, 
in doing them down, are its satisfactions, for these appear to yield 
assurance of one's eminence and potency as a social presence, But with 
this comes division, envy, dependence, vanity and the dominant cha- 
racteristics of our present unendurable condition. And so we confront (or 
avoid, to our cost) the choice. 
Amour-propre is not, it is true, absent from the members of a 
<&partan city». But, in this case, these members have become entirely 
socialized, and any desire for prestigious precedence will automatically 
become directed towards civilly estimable objectives, towards bringing 
credit to the city or nation, not towards individual distinction won in 
another's despite. We, however, are not spartans, nor, given the points 
made earlier, should we want to be. But then there remains nowhere to 
find rest. 
It would, of course, be absurd to say that nothing in Rousseau's work 
encourages this account of his ideas. To take only the points about amour- 
propre just referred to, we find, for example, this: 
Since my Emile has until now looked only at himself, the first glance 
he casts on his fellows leads him to compare himself with them. And the 
first sentiment aroused in him by this comparison is the desire to be in the 
first position. This is the point where love of self [amour de soi] turns into 
amour-propre and where begin to arise al1 the passions which depend on 
this one. (E.4 235; IV, 523; see also E.4, 243; IV, 534.) 
The talk of «comparison», of the desire to be first, powerfully suggest 
Shklar's reading. And there is much else to apparently similar effect in 
virtually al1 of Rousseu's mature writings. 
- - 
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Despite this, 1 now propose to argue that this account of what 
Rousseau understands amour-propre to be and to imply is mistaken. 
Further, 1 suggest that it is mistaken in just such a way as to lead to an 
erroneus assessment of Rousseau's views about the prospects for men 
to be able to live in a just and humane way with others, of the kind Shklar 
presents. 1 would say, too, that putting this matter straight is not an idle 
exercise, in that what results may be an assessment more faithful to 
Rousseau, but one which consists in ideas which are incredible or useless. 
1 think that the picture which results is certainly as compelling and 
interesting as that which is more familiarly painted of the escene Rous- 
seau is offering us here. 
We can note, straigh away, that the passage quoted just above con- 
tinues in what must appear a surprising way if the familiar interpretation 
of Rousseau's meaning is accepted. It goes on: 
But to decide whether among these passions the dominant ones in his 
character will be humane and gentle or cruel and malignant, whether they 
will be passions of beneficence and commiseration or of envy and co- 
vetousness, we must know what position he will feel he has among men, 
and what kinds of obstacles he may believe he has to overcome to reach 
the position he wants to occupy. (ibid.4) 
Rousseau here plainly says that humane, gentle, beneficent passions 
can depend on amour-propre quite as much as cruel, malignant ones may. 
Which of these will come to dominate a person's character is conditional 
- conditional upon the «position» he feels he has among men, and upon 
the obstacles he believes stand is his way to occupying that position. 
1 should grant that it is not impossible that these comments of 
Rousseau's should be brought into line with customary interpretations. 
It could be argued, for example, that the position Rousseau has in mind 
is that occupied by a person who - as Shklar puts it - is wholly 
«absorbed by his social role» so that he becomes only «part of a purposive 
social unit». So, then, we should have the «spartan» model referred to 
above; someone could be fired by amour-propre, but in this his objectives 
would be civil, public distinctions for his «unit». He wouPd then be 
benevolent, humane, towards his own kind at least. But there is nothing 
at al1 in the text at this point to suggest this was in Rousseau's mind. 
4. For a fuller discussion of this passage, see N.J.H. Dent: Rousseau, pp. 52-56 and 
Ch. 4. 
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Rousseau might, of course, be being inconsistent; he is notorious for such 
a fault. 1 would suggest, though, that he is offering here an entirely clear 
and fundamental point about amour-propre as he understands that, and 
it is our business to make sense of it. To do so, 1 want to examine the 
idea (or: an idea) of «standing», of what it is for a person to have or hold 
standing in his relations to and transactions with other people; and 1 want 
to consider how and why the possession of standing is valuable and 
important for us. 
1 do not suggest that what 1 am about to present is an analysis of 
the «ordinary meaning of the word «standing»». 1 am more interested 
in the phenomena concerned, and although 1 think these are by and large 
the phenomena the term «standing» comprehends, 1 shall not mind if my 
use is somewhat stipulative. 
The possession of standing can consist in the possession by someone 
of many very different powers, titles, roles, opportunities in different 
contexts, dealings and relations. It is impossible to give and exhaustive 
treatment, so 1 shall outline my point throug a couple of briefly given 
examples. Consider, for instance, the standing of a child in relation to 
the making of the decision where and when the annual family holiday 
shall be taken. One possibility could be this. A child rnay have strong 
preferences, to which powerful expression is given. It rnay be that these 
preferences are heard and heeded by the other members of the family; 
the decision process includes an attempt to meet the child's wishes, and 
an equal weigth is given to these wishes alongside everyone else's. But 
it could be that whether these preferences are heeded, and whether they 
are given much or little weight, depends entirely on the adults, upon their 
discretion and grace, since the adults reserve to themselves the exclusive 
management and determination of the decision process. Or again, the 
attempt to meet the child's preferences is made, but because the declared 
preferences are incompatible, little meeting of them, is actually achieved. 
The child, then, rnay not be given scope to question the decision, to ask 
for a reworking of it; but neither rnay he be able to withdraw from the 
proposed trip that will determine what his holiday is. Perhaps with (late) 
teenage children it is unnecessary or impossible to carry through this last 
point. If no actually mutually agreeable proposal can be found, then 
maybe it is better al1 round (- and this rnay have to be a mutually 
agreeable proposal) that people go their different ways. And so on - 
with many variations. 
One more example. Course and examinataion structure alterations 
are brought to a departmental board. Each staff member whose working 
practices will be governed by the new proposals rnay be unrestrictedly 
at liberty to comment on them; no-one is disqualified, or has to meet 
conditions, in order to be able to do so. If just one member of the board 
is deeply unhappy about the proposals, then it could be thought irnproper 
Absolute and relative existance 45 
to introduce them. Or, perhaps, unless that person is ready to make it 
a «resignation» issue, he will be expected, and will expect, to comply 
with the will of the majority. And so on - with many variations. 
What 1 want to take from these sketchy instantes are one or two 
points of generalisable significance. Our lives are affected, our behaviour 
and desires are touched, almost al1 the time by the actions (and inactions) 
of others - near and remote others. On many occasions when this 
happens or is going to happen, we very much want to «have a say in» 
the change in our life that is coming about. If we cannot, we often enough 
feel presumed upon, taken for granted, taken advantage of, imposed 
upon, treated as if we are invisible, don't count etc. etc. We feel, in short, 
that we are treated as non-persons in relation to what is being done. In 
my first example, the child's preferences do feature in the attempt to 
determine what is going to happen to him. But that they do is at the 
discretion and favour of the adults; the child and the child's preferences 
are involved in the deliberations not «as of right» but by revocable gift, 
the withdrawal of which is unchallengeable. 
1 do not want to say that the child has no standing at al1 in the decision 
process, in its progress or outcome. But he has at best a fragile and 
marginal standing. Contrast a situation where one adult treated the 
preferences of another adult in this fashion. This would, 1 imagine, be 
felt as an outrage, to treat the other person as if beholden to the favour 
and grace of the first before his preferences are admitted to the debate 
(even if it were that the preferences are admitted). One might rather 
suppose that adult's preferences hold, as such, leve1 claim and demand 
for consideration as comprising the constitutive material for the deli- 
berative process in itself, without there being any imaginable question 
of permission, grace or indulgente coming into the case. The adults 
possess an absolute, categorical, footing in constituting the deciding body 
and the decision process; and that process goes forward without any issue 
of the authority or right of each to speak and determine being raisable. 
No-one has the place to vet qualifications, to rule someone in or out of 
order: each holds undisputable position as making up the deliberative 
body as such. 
This is more like what 1 want to cal1 «holding standing». It signifies, 
roughly, holding a categorical, unchallengeable, right and title of in- 
clusion and participation, in such a fashion that no-one stands in any 
super-ordinate place to preclude or to permit inclusion and participation. 
If you hold standing - in the sort of instance 1 am interested in - you 
comprise one of those who does any permitting or precluding there may 
be done, and not because you are allowed to do so, for that would imply 
a yet further person or body who grants your title. Your possession of 
standing is indebted to no-one, by no-one's grace, subject to no-one's 
allowance. So it is, now referring to my second example, in the relations 
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of colleagues in a departmental discussion (we might suppose ...). 
To hold standing, after this fashion, in relation to decisions about 
holidays naturally involves differents powers, opportunities from those 
relevant to making departmental decisions, of course; and so it will go 
in relation to each different sort of activity that involves a multiplicity 
of persons. But, relative to each case, there will be something, or a cluster 
of things, recognisable as the denial or refusal of standing to a person, 
making them a «non-person» as far as that matter is concerned. Palpably, 
we are apt to mind very much that this does not happen to us. Not because 
- or nor necessarily because - of some shrill and strident demand that 
we should be the one deferred to. That would be to require others to 
accept just that subordinate place we so much object to. They have no 
more cause to find that tolerable than we do. Nor do we necessarily fear 
that if we do not hold standing, we are bound to be ignored, our pre- 
ferences dismissed, our interests violated. The people around us may be 
kind, benevolent, concerned for us. But, even so, our needs only find 
admittance on their good favour, by their say-so. We remain only con- 
ditionally included and reckoned with, and we may - we often should 
- see no reason at al1 why that should be our place when, apparently, 
they see themselves as unconditionally involved, as the granters and 
givers. Why is not our inclusion undeniable and irrevocable? Why are 
we subordinated, even if our lives are gently abd well looked after? 
Such-like points are very well expressed by Wasserstrom, discussing 
racial discrimination. 1 quote, selecti~ely:~ 
A different reaction of White Southerners in respect to recent events 
in the South is bewilderment ... the White Southemer will say that he simply 
cannot understand the Negro's dissatisfaction with his lot. This is so 
because he, the White Southemer, has always treated his Negroes very well. 
With appreciable sincerity, he will assert that he has real affection for many 
Negroes. He would never needlesly inflict pain or suffering on them. 
Indeed, he has often assumed special obligations to make certain that their 
lives were free from hunger, pain, and disease ... 
What is wholly missing from this description of the situation is the 
ability and inclination to conceptualize the Negro ... as the possible posses- 
sor or nghts of any kind ... what this way of conceiving most denies to any 
Negro is the opportunity to assert claims as a matter of rigth. It denies him 
the standing to protest against the way he is treated. If the White Southerner 
fails to do his duty, that is simply a matter between him and his conscience ... 
it requires of any Negro that he makes out his case for the enjoyment of 
any goods. It reduces al1 of his claims to the leve1 of requests, privileges, 
5. Richard Wasserstrom: ~Rights, Human Rigts, and Racial Discrimination~, Jour- 
nal of Philosophy, 61, 1964, pp. 639-641. For some related points, see also, T.E. Hill: 
«Servility and Self-Respect~, Monist, 1973. 
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and favors. But there are simply certains things, certains goods, that nobody 
ought to have to request of another. There are certain things that no one 
else ought to have the power to decide to refuse or to grant ... a society 
based on such a denial [of human rights] is especially offensive because 
it implicitly, if not explicitly, ... read[s] certain persons, al1 of whom are 
most certainly human beings, out of the human race... 
The point in raising these matters here is now to contend that amour- 
propre, as such, consists in the desire - which Rousseau believes is 
native to each of us - to secure and to hold standing, as at least a 
«member of the human race», as a person among persons. (It is well to 
recall that a «person» in law means any entity capable of possessing 
rights and duties: it is not a «natural kind» term.)61t is the desire to be 
established, empowered, entitled in a categorical fashion, in relation to 
certain basic but absolutely central matters, at least on the same footing 
as other persons, in the general sort of fashion 1 have tried to indicate 
in the preceding section. 
Such a desire can «latch» on to inappropriate objectives, and its 
manifestation can take corrupt forms; 1 shall say a bit more about this 
below. But it is far from inappropriate as  such to desire to hold standing. 
Possession of that is quite evidently wholly central to human good when 
the forum for securing that involves regular relation and transaction with 
others. This is not merely because, if one does not hold standing, one's 
other desires and projects may be frustrated and marginalised. For that 
need not be true - as adverted to above. It is principally because to be 
denied standing, or simply not to hold it, is in many instantes to be 
treated as a signal inferior, a dependent, a nullity, and that is, in itself, 
an affront one's need and nature: that requires recognition for oneself 
as a significant counting presence in one's own being. To wish to count 
for something (compare E.2, 160; IV, 421), to be incorporated on al1 fours 
with others, is not an hysterical, competitive wish in itself. It need only 
be the claim for recognition, acknowledgment of one's h~mani ty .~  
Amour-propre perhaps most literally means: to have care for one's own, 
what is proper or due to one. To care for that is not automatically to have 
become vain, to glory in others' ignominy, to relish others' humiliation. 
It may be no more than to have self-respect and to clairn respect for one's 
proper human dignity. 
6. See Barry Nicholas: An Introduction to Roman Lm, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1969, pp. 60-1. 
7. One might think here of Shylock's famous speech: The Merchunt of Venice, Act 
3. Scene 1. 
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Amour de soi, as Rousseau understands this, directs a person to seek 
what is endunngly good, enriching and life enlarging for himself (see, 
for instance, E.4, 212-3; IV, 490-1). If we consider man only as an 
unconnected, animate organism, then his amour de soi will direct him 
to provide for his physical well-being, and to acquire and enjoy the 
capabilities necessary to his unimpeded physical self-expression. But if 
we consider him also as making his way in relation and transaction, of 
many kinds, with others, then his amour de soi will direct him to ensure 
that he possesses a firm, unconditional, footing in the progress of joint 
affairs, as part of his good and established life in such a context (see E.4, 
214; 219-20; 233; IV, 493; 500-1, 520-1). There is, therefore, no dis- 
continuity here in what a person is concemed for - his own well-being 
and faring. It is only that the terms and circumstances in which he 
proceeds to secure his well-being have altered. Thus when Rousseau says 
that amour de soi «tums into» amour-propre (as quoted), he does not 
mean that amour de soi is converted into, or displaced by, some quite 
distinct and necessarily conflicting form of concem for self. What he 
means is that, in the forum of human inter-relation where humans are 
in constant contact and negotiation, the concem for the well-being of 
one's self which is amour de soi acquires an additional particular ob- 
jective - that of secunng standing or «rank» for oneself. When it 
includes also that objective, it is designated camour-propre~; that is the 
narne to be given to amour de soi when the possession of human standing 
has come to be a major obje~tive.~ 
I said above that amour-propre can acquire inappropnate objectives 
and take corrupt forms. It can become associated with «dependence, 
weakness, vanity, competitiveness, inequality, and an unlirnited number 
of other ills», in Shklar's words (S. 10). Rousseau himself evidently 
stresses this as well, to such an extent that - as I have indicated - nearly 
al1 interpreten take these deformed disclosures of amour-propre for the 
thing itself. It will then appear inevitable that the remedies could only 
be either withdrawal from society, or a complete socialization, functio- 
nalisation, of the self. But we see now that this is not how the case stands 
at all. It is worth, however, a brief account to consider how amour-propre 
does take on a malign character. For when it is seen how this comes 
about, we can also see how, when it is true to its own proper character 
and need (cf. E.4, 212-3; IV, 490-l), it has a benign character, both for 
its possessor and for those who surround him. 
Rousseau's deepest explanation for the emergence of perverse ma- 
nifestations of amour-propre lies in his account of the earliest psycho- 
8. This paragraph compresses a very complex argument. See Dent, Rousseau, Ch. 
1, Sections 2.4-2.5. 
--- - 
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logical responses of an infant and child. His principal thought in this is 
that, because of the infant's own aggression and rage, he represents his 
dife-world» as one in which he is set about by vengeful, spiteful persons 
bent upon thwarting, maliciously abusing hirn (see, for instance, E.2, 87.- 
8; IV, 314; and the story of the two young men: E.4, 228 ff; IV, 512- 
3). In such a supposed setting, it will appear imperative to hold one's 
own, claim one's place, by adopting a domineering and overbearing 
posture of attempted control over others, perceived as tl~reatening.~ Writ 
large, this entails that the leading feature of al1 human encounter will be 
that each person will feel that he can establish his place and potency in 
relation ro the other only by domineering control, by ascendancy of 
hirnself and negation of the other. Such alone would be a secure proof, 
a secure possession, of assurance in winning recongnition from and 
undeniable presence in the life of another. Others defer to one; one's word 
and need carry preeminent weigth; one's imperiousness makes others fa11 
back in fear and disarray. 
But, Rousseau's thought is, standing and rank is not soundly and 
genuinely held on such terms. The preeminence possessed is not freely 
and willingly granted to one; it is retained only by force or trickery and 
fraud. It depends on the gullibility or weakness of those around you. To 
keep them in subjection their predelictions and vulnerabilities must be 
played upon; but then the leader is controlled by the vagaries of this 
followers: 
Even domination is servile when it is connected with opinion, for you 
depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudices. To  lead them 
as you please, you must conduct yourself as they please. They have only 
to change their way of thinking, and you must perforce change your way 
of acting ... (E. 2, 83; IV, 308). 
Plainly, no categorical standing with others has been achieved in this 
at all, no recognition of the humanity in one's own person from them. 
One weakness, one false move, and those who contend also for as- 
cendancy will tear your down and inflict on you the same ignominy it 
has been your pleasure to inflict on them.I0 
It cannot proceed like this if categorical standing is to be sought and 
possessed. So far from this involving the inferionty and humiliation 
under one of others, it in fact requires that they also hold standing in the 
same way. This emerges in at least two ways. First, only those who are 
9.1 have discussed this aspect of Rousseau's thought also in: ~Aggresion, Love and 
Morality: Wollheim on Rousseau*, forthcoming. 
10. Compare Rousseau's remark (aconsiderations on the Governrnent of Poland~, 
Ch. 6, 111, 974), that «debased peoplesn think that «in order to be free, it is enough to 
be insubordinate». 
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sure and collected in their own possession of worth and self-respect, 
whose acknowledgement can reveal an awareness of and proper va- 
luation of human dignity, will create the possibility of there being such 
a place which is the possession of categorical standing to be occupied. 
If people are governed by envy and hatred, there can exist no such thing 
as honour and recognition." (In fact, this is to put as a sequence what 
must take place in the sarne moment. The appropriate notions of self- 
respect and personal dignity are, so to say, the individual's perspective 
on a fonn of relation of reciprocal categorical acknowledgement between 
persons: the notions and the mode of common relation rise and fall 
together). 
Secondly, if others find categorical admission in the conduct of 
certain basic components of your life, as you do in their lives, then the 
need to contend for mastery is removed - position is securely held 
already. The supposed permanent threat of annihilation is removed. Thus 
it follows that the need and will to admit the standing of others is intrinsic 
to any one person's desire for standing for himself. 
It may well appear, of course, to one who Is used to thinking of his 
substance as a weight-carrying person in terms of the subjugation beneath 
him of others that to afford others a leve1 position would comprise an 
intolerable presumption on their part and an unendurable abnegation on 
his. But, if Rousseau is right, it is only on such a condition that the 
possession of personal standing is conceivable, let done likely to be 
achieved. His desire for that, which presently takes a distorted and self- 
defeating expression, could only then be met. 
v 
Much more could, and should, be said to amplify and consolidate 
these claims. But «Humed on by the rapidity of time ... » (D.I. 79; 111, 
167), 1 pass to my concluding comments. 
For Rousseau, the coming into proper play of amour-propre is 
identical with the rise of the desire and claim to be, and to be regarded 
as, a «moral being» with the powers and titles appropriate to that: 
The study suitable forman is that of his relations. So long as he knows 
himself only in his physical being, he ought to study himself in his 
11. Compare Aristotle's remark that those who seek practical their good, seek to 
be honoured by amen of practical wisdom ... on the ground of their virtue». (Ethica 
Nicomachea, 1095 b 25-30). Adn see also E.4,339, IV, 671: Emile awill be quite gratified 
to be approved in everything with good character ... He will ... say ... «I rejoice because 
they approve of what 1 have done that is good ... so long as they judge so soundly, it will 
be a fine thing to obtaing their esteemn. 
- - 
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relations with things. ... When he begins to sense his moral being, he ought 
to study himself in his relations with men. This is the job of his whole 
life. (E.4, 214; IV, 493). 
As a «moral being», one is entitled to feature in the proposals and 
conducts of others in certain undeniable and absolute ways, as fitting to 
one's standing as human, as a person. But in clairning and holding that 
standing for oneself one is bound to the recognition and acceptance of 
a like standing for others. There exists, then, at a base level a bond of 
reciprocal, equal acknowledgement and respect between persons, each 
holding categorical place with each.12 This «base level» of mutual, level 
acknowledgement meets, at once, the needs of amour-propre in each 
person compatibly with each other person, in the sarne «structure». And 
it is by reference to this that Rousseau derives the primary criteria for 
any just and legitimate civil order. 
No such order can possibly be legitimate if it flouts this moral 
position in relation to any one person who is going to be comprehended 
under the rule and law of that order. If this were done, that person would 
be denied standing, rendered a nullity, and be in nothing other than 
servitude having no ground of obligation towards the community in 
which he is forcibly kept. This is part at least of the meaning of 
Rousseau's saying that, in the «social compact», each member is received 
as «an indivisible part of the whole» (S.C. 1, 6; III, 361). There is no 
civil society where the terms and conditions which govern al1 are de- 
termined only by some. The rest could remain only because of force; as 
such they are not «in union» with the others, they are «divided» from 
them. 
It becomes imperative, therefore, to state what the titles, powers, 
capabilities definitive of the possession of moral being, of categorical 
standing of this kind, are. This 1 shall not attempt generally to undertake 
here. But some of the instances central to Rousseau's argument are, of 
course, defence and protection of the person and goods of each indi- 
vidual, even to the point of relieving anyone who might otherwise perish 
- and this, in civil society, is to be undertaken «with the whole common 
force» (S.C. 1,6; 111,360; see also DPE 131-2; III, 256). The reason why, 
for each person, the «whole common force» must be involved is that if 
this were not done, and individual or sectional force only were deployed, 
then some would at once be being asigned a lesser or inferior status which 
12. 1 have completely omitted from this discussion any reference to Rousseau's 
detailed and profound treatment of the psychological roots and role of this mutual 
«human» acknowledgement, founded in the sentirnent of compassion. Any full defence 
of my view would, of course, have to include this. See Dent, Rousseau, Ch. 4. 
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would immediately violate their standing. And this brings out a deeper 
point, to show how the conversion of rnan as «moral being» to rnan as 
«citizen» is necessary and desirable. 
At the start of S.C. 2, 6, (111, 378) Rousseau writes: 
Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; 
but this justice, to be adrnitted among us, must be mutual. Humanly 
speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective 
among men: they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing 
of the just, when the just rnan observes them towards everybody and 
nobody observes them towards him. Conventions and laws are therefore 
needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object. 
The point is plain. «Rational universal justice» alone directs mutual 
moral recongnition. But it does not achieve what it directs. Civil law and 
the common force must be deployed to ensure that where duty is done 
right is also enjoyed and justice is actually achieved. But it remains that 
the primary objective of civil law and the use of common force is to 
sustain and uphold the «moral arder» of right and equal human re- 
cognition. 
Precisely how these rights, and the liberties and powers, of indi- 
vidual~ who hold standing with other individuals are embodied in the 
structure and fucntioning of the sovereign body of Rousseau's state, and 
in its final determinations, is another (massive) issue 1 sirnply shall not 
begin upon. 1 shall be content to have made some effective case for 
saying: 
1. Rousseau's civil association is not, and is not envisaged by him 
as, no permanent abode formen. In its principal components, it articulates 
and ensures the terms and conditions in which each person can effectively 
hold standing with each other person as a moral being, whose dignity 
in his own being is respected. 
2. Possession of such standing, the need and desire to hold it securely, 
are al1 facets of amour-propre. This directs a person to seek and secure 
categorical footing with others. As one person secures this, so do others 
alike. Amour-propre does not require the degradation of others; it re- 
quires their recognition. 
3. Being a rnan and being a citizen are not, therefore, exclusive of 
each other and each impossible. As 1 stated earlier on, my claim is that 
to say what «becomes» a citizen we need to know what «becomes» a 
man, and to possesses what «becomes» a rnan we need to become 
citizens. 
The elements of paradox and tragedy many find so attractive, indeed 
so perceptive, in Rousseau's views may have largely disappeared on my 
account. But 1 do not think he is left looking merely bland. 
